


Provided for non-commercial research and educational use.
Not for reproduction, distribution or commercial use.

This article was originally published in International Encyclopedia of Human Geography, 2nd Edition, published by Elsevier, and the attached copy is provided by Elsevier for the author's benefit and for the benefit of the author's institution, for non-commercial research and educational use, including without limitation, use in instruction at your institution, sending it to specific colleagues who you know, and providing a copy to your institution's administrator.



All other uses, reproduction and distribution, including without limitation commercial reprints, selling or licensing copies or access, or posting on open internet sites, your personal or institution's website or repository, are prohibited. For exceptions, permission may be sought for such use through Elsevier's permissions site at:

<https://www.elsevier.com/about/our-business/policies/copyright/permissions>

From Gillespie, K., 2020. Animal Welfare. In: Kobayashi, A. (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of Human Geography, 2nd edition. vol. 1, Elsevier, pp. 133–138.

<https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-102295-5.10331-2>

ISBN: 9780081022955

Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. unless otherwise stated. All rights reserved.

Elsevier

Animal Welfare

Kathryn Gillespie, Seattle, WA, United States

© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary

Anthropocentrism A human-centered point of view that can shape social, legal, political, and economic systems and relationships between human and nonhuman beings.

Cruelty A term used to describe forms of unacceptable and nonnormalized harm to animals. Cruelty discourses can be used to normalize widely practiced majority practices and villainize practices of marginalized human communities.

De-anthropocentric An approach that decenters human experience as the most important consideration and aims to consider more multispecies forms of care, living, and well-being.

Welfare The emotional, psychological, and physical well-being of animals, with wide variation in how this is understood. Welfare can include basic needs, such as food, water, and shelter, or recognition of more complex needs, like companionship and kinship, feelings of safety, and freedom from harm.

Welfarism An ethical-political position that fundamentally accepts human use of animals but tries to reduce the harmful effects of this use.

Since the late 20th Century, geographers concerned with the lives and labors of nonhuman animals have explored well-being, flourishing, care, and violence across socially constructed species boundaries. Animal geographers have studied the messy entanglements between humans and other species, and have interrogated the socially constructed boundaries between “the human” and “the animal” and the ethical questions that these boundaries generate. Globally, there is a much longer history of deeply fraught questions over the ethical and political positioning of nonhuman animals in relation to human societies. The five major world religions each, in their foundational texts and teachings, articulate a concern for nonhuman life and offer moral guidelines for how humans ought to care for other species. Intellectual traditions from philosophy to biology have ruminated over human–animal relations, what capacities of cognition and emotion nonhuman animals possess, as well as how other species experience and live their lives. Woven through these various perspectives is concern over the welfare of nonhuman animals and how their welfare should be defined.

Definitions of animal welfare vary greatly, depending on the geographic context and who is framing the conversation. Within a tapestry of definitions, the concept and practices of animal welfare are also profoundly anthropocentric, especially in the ways that welfare gets instrumentalized and commodified to advance human interests and to perpetuate widespread animal use by humans. Animal welfare is also geographically contextualized, with ideas about how animals should be treated varying widely not only within geographic places but also across different kinds of spaces. Geographies of development, globalization, and political economy compromise animal welfare in zones of multispecies conflict and in industry practices that travel and take shape globally. Within a global context, animal welfare is mobilized in cultural and racial politics of exclusion and used as a tool to exclude, vilify, and marginalize already marginalized human communities. These insights reveal that animal welfare is frequently taken up as an anthropocentric project that is more interested in reproducing the status quo than in making meaningful and profound change in the lives and deaths of other species. The question is whether welfare is a viable framework going forward or whether another framework is better suited to multispecies flourishing.

Defining Animal Welfare

At its most basic, *animal welfare* refers to the emotional, psychological, and physical well-being of nonhuman animals. A fluid and subjective concept, *welfare* does not universally define for all species the boundaries between harm and care, or minimum standards of care versus a sense of flourishing for both individuals and species. Welfare refers to how animals are responding to the conditions under which they live: Some definitions of welfare require only the most basic signals of physical well-being (e.g., adequate food, shelter, water), while others call for more robust understandings of “good” welfare that acknowledges that nonhuman animals have rich inner lives and emotions (e.g., ability to express species-specific behaviors, be in relationships with others of their kind, be free from fear and harm, etc.). Global perspectives on animal welfare vary widely through a range of religious, philosophical, intellectual, and practical frameworks. Legal mechanisms operate to define animal welfare laws around the world, legislating at the national, state, or regional level what constitutes “good” welfare, to whom it applies, and in what contexts, and how welfare laws should be enforced. Along with the institution of law, social norms in place-specific contexts often dictate the way welfare

is conceptualized and practiced based on how certain species are positioned in cultural and religious beliefs and what kinds of practices get normalized.

Governments, not-for-profit organizations, and animal use industries form a constellation of formal actors determining animal welfare globally. Governments write laws to govern how humans should treat animals, sometimes running inspections of spaces of animal use to ensure proper implementation of animal welfare standards. For the most part, animal welfare legislation tends to be lax in its coverage and is routinely insufficiently enforced. Nonetheless, government is a primary framework through which animal welfare is defined. Not-for-profit organizations dedicated to advocating for improved welfare for animals have sprung up around the globe in contexts where their lives are affected by human activity. Organizations like the Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and local humane societies operate at local or regional levels to advocate for educational and practical implementation of certain welfare practices, and they are also often involved in lobbying for more stringent animal welfare laws. To complete this web of formal actors, industries themselves are involved in determining how welfare gets defined. Animal use industries operate powerfully to lobby governments to write industry-friendly legislation and to keep penalties and fines for violations minimal.

Animal welfare is commonly discussed in contexts where nonhuman animals are domesticated and held captive in spaces of human design and use; for instance, animal welfare is widely debated in spaces of farming, laboratory research, the keeping of pets, and in zoos and aquaria. These are sites where animals are legally categorized as property, instrumentalized for human ends, and commodified in the accumulation of capital. Each of these contexts discursively constructs animals in distinct ways that justify the human control of their reproduction, movement, lives, labors, and deaths: as food or fashion, as research subjects, as family members and objects of affection, as subjects of conservation and education. Even so-called wild or free-living animals are often subjected to human control through hunting or trapping; management strategies of culling, sterilization, and control of their movements; and human incursion into their habitats. Because animals' lives and deaths are so thoroughly shaped by human decision-making and behavior, their well-being and flourishing are regularly, profoundly compromised, subordinated to human interests and priorities. Animal welfare, then, becomes a coded way of talking about nonhuman animals' well-being within the widely accepted frameworks of animal use and human encroachment on animals' bodies and spaces.

Anthropocentrism and Welfare: Instrumentalization and Commodification

The concept of animal welfare remains persistently anthropocentric, defined as it is (in practice and theory) by humans and situated as it is within taken-for-granted norms about animals' place in human societies. Humans determine how welfare is defined for other species (for instance, what constitutes good welfare for a dog or a cow) and, at the same time, are in positions of significant power and control over how nonhuman individuals and species live and die. Furthermore, welfare is also often understood in relation to capacities (how animals think, feel, move, etc.), and these capacities are most often hierarchized in relation to normative human capacities. Those framed as "higher-order" species (like chimpanzees or cetaceans) will typically have more robust welfare guidelines attached to their care in spaces of captivity, while "lower-order" species (such as rats, mice, or chickens) will have few or no welfare guidelines or protections. In the United States, for instance, the Animal Welfare Act of 1996 (enforced by the United States Department of Agriculture) protects certain animals in spaces of human use; in research laboratories, the Animal Welfare Act sets minimum standards of care in the feeding, housing, and veterinary care of species like nonhuman primates, cats and dogs, and other warm-blooded species (with the exception of rats, mice, and birds who have fewer protections). Cold-blooded species, such as amphibians and fish, are excluded entirely from the Animal Welfare Act, reflecting their hierarchical positioning as distant from humans and other "humanlike" animals.

The anthropocentrism of animal welfare is a cause for concern because of the myriad ways that animals are used and instrumentalized by humans; because humans have a vested interest in continuing to use other animals as they see fit, humans determining how welfare is understood in other species represent a profound conflict of interest.

One result is the euphemistic or oxymoronic language that humans use to conceal violence against nonhuman animals and the well-established narratives humans construct to normalize this violence. The term *humane slaughter* in agricultural contexts, for instance, rebrands the act of killing an animal in their adolescence and claims that this killing (through legal regulatory mechanisms and certain practices of slaughter) can be made humane. In fact, raising animals for food results in premature death by slaughter, no matter how well they have been cared for during their lives, and this killing—no matter how normalized—involves significant violence against the animal. In some farming contexts, the word *euthanasia* is used to refer to slaughter, euphemistically renaming as a "good death," an inherently violent process that is not in the interest of the animal. *Euthanasia*, which is more often colloquially used to describe killing or death that is in the best interest of the being themselves, is also a common term to describe killing animals in laboratory settings. When animals are no longer useful as research subjects, either because a study has ended or because the animal has been used in a way that fundamentally compromises their well-being and survival, laboratories will most often kill them and dispose of their bodies as biomedical waste.

Zoos, too, kill animals prematurely in the case of those termed *surplus animals*. Marius the giraffe at the Copenhagen Zoo in Denmark drew public attention to this common practice of killing animals in 2014 when he was killed and fed to the lions in front of a crowd of onlookers. Normalizing the killing of animals through discursive mechanisms of *humaneness*, *euthanasia*, and *surplus* is a key feature of constructing a powerful narrative of *animal welfare* in situations of animal use by humans. Premature death by killing is, in many ways, the most difficult site to maintain a strong sense of animal welfare, since it involves an irreparable and ultimate

harm (killing), and so an enormous amount of energy in animal use industries is dedicated to normalizing and naturalizing this violent act.

Practices of killing animals as well as how animals are raised in animal use industries such as agriculture, biomedical sciences, and zoos and other sites of entertainment reveal how these industries have instrumentalized notions of animal welfare to make various forms of animal use palatable and profitable. In some geographic and sociopolitical contexts, practices contributing to animal welfare in raising animals are commodified, used to help sell the commodities derived from the appropriation of animal lives. In the case of *free-range* or *cage-free* egg farming in the United States, for instance, the absence of cages or the ambiguous term *free-range* is used in marketing to appeal to consumers concerned with the well-being of farmed animals. Such animal welfare discourses used in marketing signal to the consumer that the company is concerned with the well-being of animals, and it signals that they have reflected on problems of poor welfare and responded to concerns through implementing animal welfare improvements. The consumer, then, is reassured and purchases that product over another without animal welfare marketing so that they continue their consumption and use of animals uninterrupted. The cage-free hen, however, although she might not be confined to a cage, is still raised in captivity, bred to lay an egg nearly every day, and will be slaughtered after a few years when her reproductive system begins to fail; welfare says nothing about the fundamental ways that she is instrumentalized and commodified—killed when she is no longer useful—for human ends.

Welfare is also leveraged in the commodification of animal bodies through logics that highlight how good welfare results in better animal-based products. For instance, animals who are not beaten or harmed physically experience less bruising, which results in less damage to their flesh and thus less “waste” when they are slaughtered and dismembered for meat production. Stress hormones also alter the taste and quality of animals’ flesh consumed as meat, so from a business perspective, better welfare and less stress in animals leads to greater profits. This is a familiar discourse circulating within meat and dairy industries: Good welfare can increase profits. To illustrate, Temple Grandin, a US-based animal scientist involved in redesigning slaughterhouses, has committed to improving the experiences of animals (cows in particular) as they move into and through the slaughterhouse. Grandin’s designs reduce fearful responses that cause animals to balk in the moments leading up to slaughter, resulting in cows moving more efficiently through the slaughter line. With a reduction of stress and spatial designs of slaughterhouses oriented around the efficient movement of animals to their deaths, the meat industry can kill more animals in less time, driving profits up while simultaneously claiming improved welfare standards; however, this kind of instrumentalization and commodification of welfare, as it is oriented around profitability and efficiency, still denies the profound harm done to animals in food production and operates from the assumption that animal use is inevitable, necessary, and ethically justified in the first place. Welfare as a concept and a practice still reinforces the anthropocentric entitlement of humans to nonhuman animals’ lives, bodies, and reproductive outputs, entrenching an unquestioned hierarchy between humans and other animals.

Geographies of Animal Welfare

Conceptions of animal welfare vary depending on their geographic context and the cultural, religious, and political positioning of each species within these contexts. Indeed, as geographers have aptly noted, the kinds of spaces (e.g., farms, zoos, laboratories) and geographic places (e.g., countries, cities, rural areas) where nonhuman animals are located largely determine how their welfare is conceptualized. This varied understanding of welfare is true of the geographic context—for instance, the country or state where the animal is located can shape in important ways how they are cared for, harmed, and understood in legal terms. Krithika Srinivasan illustrates how, in India and the United Kingdom, free-roaming dogs are understood and managed very differently: In the United Kingdom, dogs are legally categorized as property and therefore an unowned dog is understood as a *stray* (signaling their out-of-placeness and their need to be managed through capture, sheltering, and sometimes killing). In India, by contrast, dogs who are not owned are understood as *street dogs* (not out-of-place but belonging to the street, and their care and management manifests differently, sometimes through feeding, or through trap, neuter, and release programs). Although, as Srinivasan notes, India’s animal welfare laws are at least partially modeled on those of the United Kingdom, dogs are one species differently conceptualized within an Indian cultural context.

Even within a particular geographic place, a particular species inhabiting a particular space may prompt different welfare concerns than that same species located in a different space. To continue with the example of Indian dogs, domesticated canines are conceptualized both as *pets* and as *street dogs*; pet dogs in India are legally categorized as property, while street dogs are not framed as property. This framing of dogs as not always already defined as property highlights the spatial dimensions of animal welfare law. In a different geographic context, a cow used in biomedical research in the United States might be protected under the Animal Welfare Act of 1996, which offers protections for certain warm-blooded animals in research laboratory settings, but that same cow would be exempted from protections under the Animal Welfare Act if raised in an agricultural setting (where federal animal welfare laws do not apply). The way animals are categorized and regulated also shapes how they can enter spaces (or not): For instance, *service dogs* who are trained as companions for humans with disabilities are permitted into public spaces such as grocery stores, whereas *free-living* or *pet* dogs may not be. Geographic context, as well as categorizations of species, shapes the lives and well-being—the inclusions and exclusions—of nonhuman animals in relation to spaces of human movement and life.

As human sites of development expand and encroach on forests and wildlife habitats, debates over free-living or wild animals’ welfare proliferate, especially where this habitat loss results in human–animal conflict. Kalli Doubleday’s research focuses on how human[carnivore] conflict in India has made global news recently, as loss of habitat and human proximity to carnivores

(such as leopards and tigers) result in violent clashes (carnivores killing or injuring humans or killing domesticated animals with violent responses by humans). The outcome is often killing of leopards or tigers by humans or capturing these animals and condemning them to a life in captivity. In the United States, coyotes have long been framed as a problematic species, first as threatening to farmed animals on ranches throughout the western United States, and more recently through coyotes' presence in urban and suburban areas where they may kill domesticated pets such as cats and dogs for food. Coyotes are killed fairly indiscriminantly as a result, through trapping, poisoning, or hunting to protect other categories of animal life seen as more valuable (the profitability of farmed animals, and the cherished place of love that pets have in families). Recent international attention has turned toward multispecies conflict in palm oil production; orangutans and other forest animals have been killed, injured, and displaced by the destruction of habitats for the production of palm oil (a ubiquitous ingredient in many processed foods). These sites of encounter and conflict dramatically influence the welfare of wild species (leopards, tigers, coyotes, orangutans) as human interests, livelihoods, and well-being eclipse animals' autonomy, survival, and flourishing. These are geographically specific sites of compromised welfare and require nuanced conversations about multispecies well-being in their resolution, especially so as globalized networks of trade, development, and markets expand.

In an increasingly globalizing landscape, ideas and practices of welfare travel around the world, in effect globalizing notions of welfare and norms of animal use. Industry practices with real implications for animal welfare are innovated in one place and then travel across national borders, transforming the way animals are bred, live, and die globally. High intensity, industrial chicken factory farming practices, for instance, developed in the eastern United States, have been exported around the world to places like Peru where, in addition to being used as a model for Peruvian chicken farming, they have been adopted in the farming of other species, such as the guinea pig. Conceptualized in places like the United States as *pet* or *research subject*, guinea pigs (or *cuyes*) have also long been a traditional indigenous Andean food source. As María Elena García explores, guinea pigs have been co-opted in the globalizing efforts of Peru's gastronomic boom, necessitating a scaling-up of production and a shift toward industrial models of guinea pig farming with deleterious consequences for both the guinea pigs themselves and for indigenous communities who traditionally raised them. Globalizing logics of efficiency, mass production and consumption, and commodification in human–animal relations utilize animal welfare to shape notions of *civilization*, *progress*, and *development*. These spatial dimensions of animal welfare—how welfare is understood, how different species are included and excluded from particular spaces, and how welfare plays out in a shifting landscape of globalizing political economies—are why geographic analyses of human–animal relations are so important. Differing conceptions of welfare, for instance, can highlight how context-specific normalization of violence occurs and how these norms become further naturalized as they spread to other places and cultural contexts.

Welfare or Cruelty? Cultural and Racial Politics in Animal Welfare

Animal welfare is frequently caught up in highly contentious cultural and racial politics within and between human societies. Will Kymlicka and Sue Donaldson argue that animal welfare law is dependent on relationships between norms of animal treatment by majority groups and practices viewed as outside the norm (often practices of racialized and marginalized communities). They highlight how actions deemed *cruel* are legally framed as outside of norms of animal treatment; actions that are normalized by the majority cannot be legally categorized as cruelty because they are protected by the way the law itself is written. An example from the United States about the relationship between cruelty laws and normalization of violence against animals is embedded in the structure of federal and state laws: Farmed animals are protected at the federal level only by the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (which covers transport to the slaughterhouse and treatment of animals during slaughter); the only other protections they are afforded are under state anti-cruelty laws, but most states have what are termed *common farming exemptions* that exempt any practices deemed *common* or *customary* (i.e., normalized) by the industries themselves. Which practices get framed as norms and others as acts of cruelty are often, when it comes down to their impact on the animal, arbitrary and have more to do with the dominance of majority practices than animal well-being.

Discourses of cruelty to animals are often used to further marginalize already marginalized communities by defining as “cruel” non-majority practices. In India, discourses of cow protectionism have been used by right-wing Hindu nationalists to incite strong anti-Muslim sentiments, resulting, for example, in the lynching of Muslims believed to be involved in cow-trading for beef. Yamini Narayanan highlights how Hindu cow protectionism is leveraged to ban beef and thus criminalize Muslims and “lower-caste” Hindus who may consume beef; this Islamophobia and casteism is couched in concern over the welfare of cows, ignoring the fact that the dairy industry (which is enthusiastically supported by Hindus throughout India) is implicated in the mass slaughter of cows for domestic beef consumption as well as to sustain a booming beef export economy. The violence inherent in dairy production, then, gets framed as a majority practice that involves good welfare considerations and cow protection, while a non-majority practice (beef consumption) gets framed as cruelty, and thus bad animal welfare. But dairy production relies on a thriving beef economy, since cows are slaughtered when their productivity and reproductive capacity declines; thus, violent objections to beef are less about actual animal welfare and more about cultural, religious, and political belief systems.

Cultural beliefs about which animals are appropriate to eat proliferate around the globe. The ubiquity of consuming cows, pigs, and chickens in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, for instance, while keeping other species like dogs and cats as pets, is based on long-established norms (that are fairly arbitrary) about categorizing species. The arbitrariness of these distinctions is lost, though, in public outrage in the United States and United Kingdom over the routine consumption of dogs

in places such as South Korea and parts of China. Dominant ideas about animal welfare rooted in industrialized agricultural models of pig, chicken, and cow farming are at odds with other cultural practices, involving other species. Public discourses in the United States and United Kingdom, then, will leave unquestioned majority practices of factory farming, while practices of raising dogs for meat are framed as *cruel* and *barbaric*, even though the actual practices do not differ drastically. Animal welfare organizations (like the Humane Society of the United States), that are concerned with many different animal welfare issues, regularly mobilize the widespread public outrage against events that celebrate the consumption of dogs. The Yulin Dog Meat Festival in Guangxi, China, for instance, has come under widespread scrutiny in the West, as racialized discourses of *barbarity* and *cruelty* are used to criticize the practice of eating dogs, while working to normalize the majority practice of eating pigs or cows. Similar racialized discourses emerge in the context of the dolphin drive hunt in Taiji, Japan, which has become another site of international scrutiny for animal welfare reasons. To be sure, it is not that these practices do not raise serious questions about violence and harm against nonhuman animals; rather, it is that there is a profound unevenness in which practices can harm animals and still be constituted as good welfare (farming pigs, cows, and chickens) and which are framed as inherently cruel (killing dogs or dolphins for meat).

Even practices approved within animal welfare law can be taken up and leveraged in highly politicized ways that promote xenophobic and Islamophobic agendas. In Europe, for instance, ritual forms of slaughter, like Halal slaughter, that are approved in animal welfare laws have come under attack from right-wing anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim groups. Kymlicka and Donaldson explain how these groups have never before been concerned with animal welfare, but see ritual slaughter as a minority practice that can be coded as *cruel* and thus instrumentalized as an exclusionary tactic in immigration politics. Thus, animal welfare law, in how it is written and renegotiated, can be instrumentalized for human political ends that work to further marginalize and exclude already precarious human communities. Meanwhile, majority practices remain safely out of the realm of scrutiny through their normalization and comfortable legal positioning in animal welfare law, regardless of how thoroughly they may in fact compromise animal well-being. It is important, then, in considering animal welfare discourses and practices to think about how they advance racially and culturally fraught political positions.

From Welfarism to Liberation?

One way to understand animal welfare is to think about the questions that notions of welfare or well-being prompt about how humans should treat, and be in relationship with, other animals. Are other animals here for humans to use as they wish? Should they be given rights, and should they be incorporated as co-citizens in what have thus far been predominantly conceptualized as *human* nations? Should nonhuman animals be considered kin, as some Indigenous ways of knowing suggest?

Within a broad tapestry of ways that human–nonhuman relationships are understood or imagined, animal welfare has been taken up as a particular kind of political position. To call someone a *welfarist* in a global context generally signals their fundamental acceptance of the use of animals for human purposes and a concern over the impacts of this use on animals. Welfarists would concern themselves with the cage size for a hen raised for eggs, for instance, or how she was treated during her life, transport, and slaughter, but they would likely not object to the fact that her life and death were oriented around—or, indeed, that she was brought into being for—commodified egg production in the first place. Welfarism has been challenged for its tacit acceptance of nonhuman animals' subordinate status in human hierarchies of care, and its complicity in ongoing structures of animal exploitation through making this exploitation appear more palatable.

In contrast to the welfarist position, an animal rights approach fundamentally objects to animal use by humans by passing laws giving legal rights to animals that would protect them from harms caused by humans. Rights could also potentially prevent humans from exploiting animals for human ends in the first place, since many forms of animal use violate basic standards of rights to living on their own terms. In this vein, the Nonhuman Rights Project, for instance, has fought for legal rights for certain nonhuman animals—those closest to humans in normative human-based notions of intelligence (cetaceans, great apes, African gray parrots, etc.). Animal rights activists and scholars are dedicated to reformulating existing legal frameworks to accommodate a wide range of species, imagining how animals can become co-citizens or persons under the law. This approach involves legal reform and a broad expansion of how humans conceptualize their relationship to other species. For instance, animal rights perspectives fundamentally oppose a sense of human entitlement to the bodies and lives of other species and reject the categorization of animals as property.

And yet, feminist and Indigenous scholars have criticized the rights framework for its persistent centering of a Western liberal intellectual and legal tradition. As Maneesha Deckha argues, law itself is an anthropocentric institution, thus urging the question of whether granting rights to nonhuman animals within a rights framework can make meaningful progress in humans' treatment and ways of knowing other animals. If law is written by and for humans (and, importantly, *particular kinds of humans*, as critical race scholars have pointed out), can it meaningfully be expanded to include a multiplicity of nonhuman species (especially species less similar to humans)? Sharing similar concerns, Billy-Ray Belcourt locates a rights-based discourse about nonhuman animal liberation squarely within a settler colonial logic in the North American context; in its place, he advocates for a decolonial animal ethic—one that recognizes domesticated animals as colonized subjects and rights and welfare discourses as settler colonial projects in need of decolonizing. What can be learned from feminist and Indigenous animal studies scholars, then, is that neither a rights nor welfare approach to animal well-being is sufficient. A new paradigm is needed for de-anthropocentric multispecies flourishing that honors species alterity and imagines a more robust and radical framework of care.

Further Reading

- Belcourt, B.-R., 2015. Animal bodies, colonial subjects: (Re)locating animality in decolonial thought. *Societies* 5, 1–11.
- Buller, H., Morris, C., 2003. Farm animal welfare: a new repertoire of nature-society relations or modernism re-embedded. *Sociol. Rural.* 43 (3), 216–237.
- Buller, H.J., Roe, E., 2013. Modifying and commodifying farm animal welfare: the economisation of layer chickens. *J. Rural Stud.* 33, 141–149.
- Deckha, M., 2013. Initiating a non-anthropocentric jurisprudence: the rule of law and animal vulnerability under a property paradigm. *Alta. Law Rev.* 50 (4), 783–814.
- Donaldson, S., Kymlicka, W., 2011. *Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- García, M.E., 2013. The taste of conquest: colonialism, cosmopolitanism, and the dark side of Peru's gastronomic boom. *J. Lat. Am. Caribb. Anthropol.* 18 (3), 505–524.
- Gillespie, K., Collard, R.-C., 2015. *Critical Animal Geographies: Politics, Intersections, and Hierarchies in a Multispecies World*. Routledge, London.
- Greenhough, B., Roe, E., 2010. From ethical principles to response-able practice. *Environ. Plan. D Soc. Space* 28 (1), 43–45.
- Kim, C.J., 2015. *Dangerous Crossings: Race, Species, and Nature in a Multicultural Age*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Kymlicka, W., Donaldson, S., 2014. Animal rights, multiculturalism, and the left. *J. Soc. Philos.* 45 (1), 116–135.
- Narayanan, Y., 2017. Dairy, Death, and Dharma: The Devastation of Cow Protectionism in India. *Animal Liberation Currents* June 18. Available: <https://www.animalliberationcurrents.com/dairy-death-dharma/>.
- Philo, C., Wilbert, C. (Eds.), 2000. *Animal Spaces, Beastly Places*. Routledge, London.
- Srinivasan, K., 2013. The biopolitics of animal being and welfare: dog control and care in the UK and India. *Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr.* 38 (1), 106–119.
- Wolch, J., Emel, J. (Eds.), 1998. *Animal Geographies*. Verso, London.

Relevant Websites

- American Veterinary Medical Association, <https://www.avma.org/KB/Resources/Reference/AnimalWelfare>.
- Animal Welfare Board of India, <http://www.awbi.org/>.
- European Union Animal Welfare, https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/welfare_en.
- Humane Society International, <http://www.hsi.org>.
- International Fund for Animal Welfare, <https://www.ifaw.org>.
- Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, <https://www.spcai.org/about-spcai/>.
- United States Department of Agriculture Animal Welfare, <https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalwelfare/>.
- World Animal Protection, <https://www.worldanimalprotection.us.org/>.